Ship Modelers Association

The USS MAINE (BB-2C), a 6682-ton second-class battleship, was built at the New York
Navy Yard. She was 324.3 feet in length, 57 feet in breadth, and 21.5 feet in depth. She
was built of steel with a complement of 374 officers and men. Her armament consisted
of 4 each 10” (2X2), 6 each 6 “, 7 each 6 pounder, 8 each 1 pounder and 4 each 18”
torpedo tubes. She had an 11” armor belt and a 4” protected deck with a vertical triple-
expansion engine capable of 9,000 ihp, 2 screws, 17 kts.
By the early 1880’s, the US Navy had fallen to 20th in the ranking of the world’s navies –
below navies of such South American countries as Chile and Brazil, which had two very
powerful turret ships under construction that were to have a marked effect upon the USS
MAINE. At that time, there were no plans to raise the level of the US Navy t the first
rank, so only two capital ships were ordered. This decision resulted in the USS TEXAS
and the USS MAINE, the plans of the former being purchased in Britain. Initial plans for
the USS MAINE allowed for a full set of sails, but these were abandoned during
construction and she emerged with two military masts. She was also described as an
armored cruiser, but this title was also dropped in favor of ranking her with battleships.
The main armament of four 10 in. guns were twin mounted in turrets set en echelon on
the main deck with the fore turret to starboard and the aft turret to port. The barbettes
protecting the turrets were sponsoned out over the ship’s side to give axial fire. Each
turret also had limited arcs of fire across the deck to the opposite side, and to aid this, the
superstructure was angled back. Problems were experienced with the blast damage and
these two battleships were the only US battleships to have this armament layout. The six
6in guns carried were located, four on the main deck (two on the bows and two aft) and
the last two on the center superstructure.
Laid down in 1888, USS MAINE was originally rigged as a bark, but the mizzen mast
was removed in 1892. The ship’s completion was delayed due to a lack of available armor plate. She was
finally commissioned in 1895. Assigned to the North Atlantic
Squadron at the end of 1895, she cruised along the east coast of the United States from
Maine to Key West.
In 1897, U.S. attention was focused on Cuban revolutionaries seeking independence from
Spain. At the same time, Navalists led by Under Secretary of the Navy Theodore
Roosevelt sought to remove the threat of an extension of Japanese influence in the
Pacific, especially with respect to the Spanish colony of the Philippines. Then, in
response to escalating violence between Cuban revolutionaries and the Spanish
authorities, President William McKinley ordered the North Atlantic Squadron moved to
winter quarters at Key West, while the Mediterranean Squadron sifted to Lisbon, from
where it could track any Spanish fleet movements towards the Caribbean.
This was not the first time the Cubans had tried to revolt from Spanish rule, the first
being between 1868 and 1878, which failed. The second attempt began in 1895. The
Spanish government reacted by sending General Valeriano Weyler y Nicolau with orders
to pacify the island. The “Butcher,” as he became known in the U.S., determined to
deprive the rebels of support by forcibly reconcentrating the civilian population in the
troublesome districts to areas near military headquarters. This policy resulted in the
starvation and death of over 100,000 Cubans. Outrage in many sectors of the American
public, fueled by stories in the “Yellow Press,” put pressure on Presidents Grover
Cleveland and William McKinley to end the fighting in Cuba. American diplomacy,
along with the return of the Liberal Party to power in Spain, led to the recall of General
Weyler. However, beset by political enemies at home, the new Spanish government was
too weak to enact meaningful reforms in Cuba. Limited autonomy was promised late in
1897, but the U.S. government was mistrustful, and the revolutionaries refused to accept
anything short of total independence.
When pro-Weyler forces in Havana instigated riots in January 1898, Washington became
greatly concerned for the safety of Americans in the country. The administration
believed that some means of protecting U.S. citizens should be on hand. On 24 January,
President McKinley sent the second class battleship USS MAINE from Key West to
Havana, after clearing the visit with a reluctant government in Madrid.
The battleship arrived in 25 January. Spanish authorities in Havana were wary of
American intentions, but they afforded Captain Charles Sigsbee and the officers of USS
MAINE every courtesy. In order to avoid the possibility of trouble, USS Maine’s
commanding officer did not allow his enlisted men to go on shore. Sigsbee and the
consul at Havana, Fitzhugh Lee, reported that the Navy’s presence appeared to have a
calming effect on the situation, and both recommended that the Navy Department send
another battleship to Havana when it came time to relieve USS MAINE.
At 2140 on the evening of 15 February, a terrible explosion on board USS MAINE
shattered the stillness of Havana Harbor. Later investigations revealed that more than
five tons of powder charges for the vessel’s six and ten-inch guns ignited, virtually
obliterating the forward third of the ship. The remaining wreckage rapidly settled to the
bottom of the harbor. Most of USS MAINE’S crew were sleeping or resting in the
enlisted quarters in the forward part of the ship when the explosion occurred. Two
hundred and sixty-six men lost their lives as a result of the disaster: 260 died in the
explosion or shortly thereafter, and six more died later from injuries. Captain Sigsbee
and most of the officers survived because their quarters were in the aft portion of the
ship.
Spanish officials and the crew of the civilian steamer CITY OF WASHINGTON acted
quickly in rescuing survivors and caring for the wounded. The attitude and actions of the
former allayed initial suspicions that hostile action caused the explosion, and led Sigsbee
to include at the bottom of is initial telegram: “Public opinion should be suspended until
further report.”
The U.S. Navy Department immediately formed a board of inquiry to determine the
reason for USS MAINE’S destruction. The inquiry, conducted in Havana, lasted four
weeks. The condition of the submerged wreck and the lack of technical expertise
prevented the board from being as thorough as later investigations. In the end, they
concluded that a mine had detonated under the ship. The board did not attempt to fix
blame for the placement of the device.
When the Navy’s verdict was announced, the American public reacted with predictable
outrage. Fed by inflammatory articles in the “Yellow Press” blaming Spain for the
disaster, the public had already placed guilt on the Spanish government. Although he
continued to press for a diplomatic settlement to the Cuban problem, President McKinley
accelerated military preparations begun in January 1898 when an impasse appeared
likely. The Spanish position on Cuban independence hardened, and McKinley asked Congress on 11 April
for permission to intervene. On 21 April, the President ordered the
Navy to begin a blockade of Cuba, and Spain followed with a declaration of war on 23
April. Congress responded with a formal declaration of war on 25 April, made
retroactive to the start of the blockade.
The destruction of the USS MAINE did not cause the U.S. to declare war on Spain, but it
served as a catalyst, accelerating the approach to a diplomatic impasse. In addition, the
sinking and deaths of U.S. sailors rallied American opinion more strongly behind armed
intervention.
In 1911 the Navy Department ordered a second board of inquiry after Congress voted
finds for the removal of the wreck of the USS MAINE from Havana Harbor. U.S. Army
engineers built a cofferdam around the sunken battleship, thus exposing it, and giving
naval investigators an opportunity to examine and photograph the wreckage in detail.
Finding the bottom hull plates in the area of the reserve six-inch magazine bent inward
and back, the 1911 board concluded that a mine had detonated under the magazine,
causing the explosion that destroyed the ship.
Technical experts at the time of both investigations disagreed with the findings, believing
that spontaneous combustion of coal in the bunker adjacent to the reserve six-inch
magazine was the most likely cause of the explosion on board the ship. In 1976, Admiral
Hyman G. Rickover published his book, How the Battleship Maine Was Destroyed. The
admiral became interested in the disaster and wondered if the application of modern
scientific knowledge could determine the cause. He called on two experts on explosions
and their effects on ship hulls. Using documentation gathered from the two official
inquiries, as well as information on the construction and ammunition of the USS MAINE,
the experts concluded that the damage caused to the ship was inconsistent with the
external explosion of a mine. The most likely cause, they speculated, was spontaneous
combustion of coal in the bunker next to the magazine.
Some have disputed the findings in Rickover’s book. To this day, a definite explanation
for the destruction of the USS MAINE remains elusive.

There is a fine kit model of this ship available at the current time. BLUEJACKET SHIP
CRAFTERS, in celebration of their 100th anniversary (1905-2005), is offering a limited
edition centennial model of the USS MAINE. The model is designed for experience
builders, incorporating a machine carved hull of laminated basswood, laser cut wood and
styrene parts, over 300 britannia metal fittings, cast resin turrets, funnels and ship’s boats,
528 photoetched brass parts in three thicknesses, five sheets of plans, and a detailed
instruction manual. There are only 100 kits produced and each kit will include a
numbered brass engraved plaque. Scale: 3'32”=1’